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Kids Say the Darndest Things: The Prosecutorial Use of
Hearsay Statements by Children
TOM LININGER'
INTRODUCTION
I am honored that Professor Aviva Orenstein and the editors of the Indiana Law
Journal have invited me to write a brief commentary on the longer submissions by
Professors Robert Mosteller and Thomas Lyon. Professor Mosteller's scholarship on
the Confrontation Clause has long impressed me as among the most cogent in this
area, 2 and Professor Lyon's interdisciplinary work has shed new light on the challenges
of cross-examining children.3 My fellow commentator Myrna Raeder has written
authoritatively about the use of hearsay in prosecutions of domestic violence.4 While I
may quibble with these authors over some points, my disagreement certainly does not
indicate any lack of admiration for their important scholarship.
Rather than offer a blow-by-blow review of the other authors' work, I will present
my own responses to three questions that the other authors have addressed. First, how
can we distinguish between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay statements by
accusers in child abuse prosecutions? Second, when the accusers' out-of-court
statements are in fact testimonial, how might we facilitate confrontation in a manner
that does not impose onerous burdens on the accusers? Third, what are the proper
parameters of forfeiture doctrine in the context of prosecutions for child abuse?
I would summarize my approach as follows: rather than sidestep the strictures of the
Confrontation Clause with expedient, but intellectually dishonest, interpretations of the
term "testimonial," courts should meet the challenge squarely. They should recognize
that a substantial proportion of statements by alleged victims of child abuse are in fact
testimonial. This conclusion should not foreclose prosecutions, however. Courts should
consider a wide range of alternatives for the cross-examination of child witnesses,
* Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law.
1. For an insightful analysis of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, which liberally
admit propensity evidence in prosecutions of child abuse, see Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due
Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1487
(2005).
2. Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring
Confrontation, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511 (2005) [hereinafter Mosteller, Encouraging and
Ensuring Confrontation]; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford's Impact on Hearsay
Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 411
(2005); Robert P. Mosteller, "Testimonial" and the Formalistic Definition-The Case for an
"Accusatorial" Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST. 14 (2005).
3. Thomas D. Lyon, Applying Suggestibility Research to the Real World: The Case of
Repeated Questions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97 (Winter 2002); Thomas D. Lyon, Child
Witnesses and the Oath: Empirical Evidence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1017 (2000) [hereinafter Lyon,
Child Witnesses and the Oath]; Thomas D. Lyon, Let's Not Exaggerate the Suggestibility of
Children, 38 CT. REv. 12 (2001) [hereinafter Lyon, Let's Not Exaggerate].
4. Myma S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness Exceptions
After Crawford, 20 CRIM. JUST. 24 (2005); Myrna S. Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the
Children Too: Crawford's Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 311 (2005) [hereinafter Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too].
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including cross-examination in settings other than trial. Courts and legislatures should
also take the Supreme Court's cue to explore the full breadth of forfeiture doctrine,
which extinguishes confrontation rights when defendants have wrongfully caused the
unavailability of declarants. In short, the solution to the "Crawford problem" is not
gamesmanship in defining the term "testimonial," but resourcefulness in meeting the
requirement of cross-examination.
I. THE NEW TAXONOMY OF HEARSAY AFTER CRA WFORD AND DA VIS
In Crawford v. Washington5 and Davis v. Washington,6 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment requires confrontation of hearsay declarants whose
statements are "testimonial." In Crawford, the Court considered three possible
definitions of "testimonial," but left for another day the precise formulation of the
definition.7 In Davis, the Court gave clearer guidance as to the meaning of
"testimonial" in investigations of domestic violence. "[S]tatements are nontestimonial
when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency," but the statements are generally testimonial if the
emergency has ended and the police are investigating past crimes.
8
Distinguishing testimonial from nontestimonial statements is more difficult in child
abuse cases than in cases involving domestic violence against adult victims. In the
latter category of cases, victims are more likely to complain to police shortly after the
violence, so the temporal parameters set by the Davis ruling are more likely to come
into play. 9 The bright-line rule in Davis will rarely apply to child abuse cases, because
the government usually does not question the complainant during the pendency of the
5. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
6. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
7. Justice Antonin Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Crawford, listed three
possible "formulations" of testimonial statements:
[(1)] "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent- that is, material
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;" [(2)] "extrajudicial statements...
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions; [and (3)] "statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial"....
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (citations omitted) (first omission in original). While Justice Scalia
did not choose between these three formulations, he did note that they all "share a common
nucleus and then define the Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around it." Id. at
52.
8. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74.
9. A significant proportion of the hearsay at issue in prosecutions of domestic violence
consists of statements to 911 operators and statements to officers from complainants who have
called for emergency assistance. Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too, supra
note 4, at 322 (characterizing the excited utterance exception as the "workhorse of domestic
violence cases").
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emergency.' 0 Thus, the Supreme Court's only guidance for child abuse cases is the
original Crawford decision, which is lamentably imprecise."
Professor Mosteller has very thoroughly canvassed the lower courts' interpretations
of "testimonial" after Crawford. 12 Rather than survey the whole spectrum here, I will
simply note its two poles. Some courts have inquired whether the child declarant could
foresee the later prosecutorial use of the declarant's statements.13 Other courts have
focused on the intentions of the government in eliciting statements from the declarant,
or in arranging for other interviewers to elicit statements from the declarant.14 These
two approaches might be distinguished as the "declarant-centered" approach and the
"government-centered" approach.
I submit that neither approach is independently sufficient. The declarant-centered
inquiry is underinclusive because many young children do not understand the criminal
justice system and do not apprehend the likelihood that a statement to an investigating
official will be preserved for later use in court. If the child declarant's understanding of
the potential for prosecutorial use were the sine qua non of testimonial hearsay, the
nafvet6 of children could make many of them immune from cross-examination.
Ironically, the characteristics of children that heighten the urgency of cross-
examination would diminish its likelihood. Moreover, the declarant-centered approach
invites manipulative conduct by police investigators. So long as police leave the child
declarant with the impression that he or she is not speaking under formal
circumstances, the government could avoid producing the child declarant in court. For
example, police could simply take the declarant to meet with an intermediary who is
10. Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation:
"A Little Child Shall Lead Them," 82 Ind. L.J. 917, 949 (2007).
11. Dissenting in Crawford, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed his fear that the difficulty of
discerning "testimonial" hearsay would cause consternation for prosecutors.
But the thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state
prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of testimony the
Court lists is covered by the new rule. They need them now, not months or years
from now. Rules of criminal evidence are applied every day in courts throughout
the country, and parties should not be left in the dark in this manner.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
12. See Mosteller, supra note 10, at 944-65.
13. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 2006) (concluding that
even though police brought child to hospital for examination by doctor, and police remained at
hospital to find out results of interview, they were not present during the interview, and a
reasonable child in the declarant's position would not have foreseen prosecutorial use of
statement to doctor); State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255-56 (Minn. 2006) ("Moreover,
given T.B.'s very young age, it is doubtful that he was even capable of understanding that his
statements would be used at a trial. As amicus American Prosecutors Research Institute makes
clear, children of T.B.'s age are simply unable to understand the legal system and the
consequences of statements made during the legal process.").
14. See, e.g., State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 916,923 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that in
prosecution of alleged child abuse, statement elicited from accuser by nurse was testimonial
because nurse practitioner was acting "in concert with" police); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349,
352 (Or. 2004) (finding that statements by three-year-old to social worker were testimonial
where social worker was "serving a proxy for the police").
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not conspicuously allied with police, but who does in fact conduct a forensic
interview. 15
On the other hand, the government-centered approach has significant drawbacks.
Even where a government agent meets with a child for a nonforensic purpose, it is
conceivable that a child could intentionally make an accusatory statement that merits
classification as "testimonial." For example, when a child blurts out an allegation of
abuse to a government official who was not expecting to hear such a comment, the
intent of the accuser should matter more than the intent of the audience. A child who
writes a note about abuse and delivers it to a passive government official is no less an
"accuser" than a child who makes such an allegation in response to interrogation.
The best approach would combine elements of the declarant-centered standard and
government-centered standard. Ideally, courts would apply these two standards in the
alternative. In other words, a child declarant's statement would be testimonial if the
child could foresee later prosecutorial use, or if the government elicited the statement
(or contrived a third-party interview that elicited the statement) for forensic purposes.
Such a hybrid approach might draw support from the Davis ruling, which primarily
stressed the purpose of the government investigators, but also noted that the declarants'
intentions are an important part of the inquiry. 16 I salute Professor Mosteller for
capturing all the nuances of the case law in this area, and for avoiding the traps of the
facile approaches urged by the most strident advocates on the left and the right.
II. FACILITATING CROSS-EXAMINATION OF CHILD DECLARANTS
Professor Lyon's expertise in psychology gives him a unique appreciation of the
challenges that arise in the cross-examination of child witnesses. Not every child fully
understands the obligation to tell the truth.17 Some children may be highly suggestible,
although it is important not to overstate this risk.'8 Research suggests that inept cross-
examination of children may distort their testimony;1 9 Wigmore's characterization of
15. See, e.g., Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 255-56; see also Michael Siegel & Daniel
Weisman, The Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements in a Post-Crawford World, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (arguing that the classification of some co-conspirator
statements as testimonial might be consistent with Crawford and Davis, even though the
declarants are not aware that they are under surveillance by law enforcement agents).
16. The Davis Court stressed that it did not intend to imply that
statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily
nontestimonial. The Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-
examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they
were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.... And of course even when
interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant's statements, not the
interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274, n.1.
17. Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Oath, supra note 3, at 1029.
18. Lyon, Let's Not Exaggerate, supra note 3, at 14.
19. Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children's Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84
CORNELL L. REv. 1004, 1042-45 (1999) (collecting research); see also A. Leo Levin, Arlene
Fickler & Malia Brink, From Competency to Rules of Limited Exclusion: Seeking Better Tools
for the Search for Truth, 27 LrTIG. 23,32 (2001) ("Lawyers struggle tremendously with how to
cross-examine a child witness effectively to expose influence without causing further influence
and distorting the truth or harming the child.").
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cross-examination as the "greatest engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth '20
may be unduly sanguine in the context of child testimony. Finally, it is important to
bear in mind that courtroom testimony can be highly traumatic for children, and this
trauma may amount to a "second victimization" of the accuser.
21
Cognizant of such hazards, courts and legislatures should explore a range of
alternatives for facilitating the cross-examination that the Sixth Amendment demands.
One solution that predates Crawford and Davis is remote testimony by the accuser,
relayed to the courtroom via closed-circuit television. In Maryland v. Craig,22 the
Supreme Court approved the constitutionality of such cross-examination in child abuse
cases if the trial court has made a record showing that the child's fragility necessitates
remote testimony. Can Craig survive Crawford and Davis? To be sure, Craig resorted
to the teleological reasoning that the Court deplored in Crawford: according to the
Craig majority, the need to protect child witnesses outweighed the benefit of in-court
examination. Moreover, the author of the dissent in Craig was none other than Justice
Antonin Scalia, who now leads the Court's pro-confrontation majority. Yet there is a
strong likelihood that Craig will withstand Crawford and Davis. The Supreme Court's
new jurisprudence has focused on the question of when confrontation is necessary, but
the Court has not revised its standards for what types of cross-examination are
adequate. The few lower courts that have considered this question have concluded that
Craig remains viable after Crawford and Davis.23 Thus lower courts should continue to
allow remote testimony, where appropriate, to reduce the hardship of cross-
examination in prosecutions of child abuse.
20. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (J. Chadboum rev., 1974).
21. George K. Goodhue, Comment, Maryland v. Craig: Balancing Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Rights with the Rights of Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Trials, 26 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 497,498 (2001) ("An extensive body of professional research clearly demonstrates that
many victimized children, when forced to testify in open court in the presence of the accused,
suffer a second victimization and traumatization.").
22. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
23. In United States v. Pack, for example, the court held that the remote testimony allowed
in Craig is still permissible after Crawford.
We are not persuaded by the appellant's further contention that the decision in
Crawford renders the holding in Craig unsound. Crawford applies only to
testimonial statements made prior to trial. The live, remote video testimony at
issue in this case was presented at trial. In addition to being a departure from long-
standing precedent, the appellant's reasoning assumes away the constitutional
issue in this case-whether the confrontation that occurred is constitutionally
sufficient. Crawford does not address this question. The proper standard to be
applied is that set forth in Craig, not Crawford. Applying that standard, we hold
that the appellant's right to confrontation of the witness in this case was not
violated. This assignment of error is without merit.
NMCCA 200400772 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2006), available at http://www.jag.navy.
miU/NMCCA/PACK%20D.%20200400772%20PCE.doc. See also State v. Blanchette, 134 P.3d
19, 22 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) ("The decision in Crawford does not affect the constitutionality of
K.S.A. 22-3434, which allows a child victim to testify by closed-circuit television .... ); State
v. Henriod, 131 P.3d 232, 237 (Utah 2006) ("We disagree with the conclusion of the district
court that Crawford abrogated Craig."); State v. Vogelsberg, 724 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2006) (upholding use of barrier between defendant and victim upon showing that "child
would likely be further traumatized by having to face his abuser at trial.").
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Another important technique to mitigate children's trauma is pretrial cross-
examination. Some commentators have suggested that battered women find depositions
less intimidating than examination at trial, because the pace is more bearable and there
are greater opportunities for breaks and conferences with counsel.24 The same
reasoning should apply to children. The Supreme Court's prior rulings, as well as
lower court rulings, indicate that pretrial cross-examination is sufficient to satisfy the
strictures of the Confrontation Clause.25 Perhaps the defense might actually prefer to
examine the child accuser in a setting comparable to the multidisciplinary centers
where the government often elicits the initial accusatory statements. If children are
more comfortable and forthright in such settings, isn't it only fair to allow defense
counsel the same opportunities that the government enjoys?
A final important step is to reduce the asperity of in-court cross-examination. Child
witnesses should be allowed to bring a support person who will stand by their side
when they testify in court.26 Ideally, child witnesses would have their own counsel with
24. See Nicole A. F. Lindenmyer, Washington v. Crawford: Must Crime Victims Testify
Against the Defendant?, BATTERED WOMEN'S LEGAL ADVOC. PROJECT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
PACKET 4 (2004), http://www.bwlap.org/TAPs/Crawford.PDF (noting that depositions are less
stressful for victims than trial testimony, and encouraging prosecutors to arrange for pretrial
depositions of victims as a means of satisfying confrontation requirements); Tom Lininger,
Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 784-97 (2005) (suggesting that
greater pretrial confrontation of accusers would ease their burden after Crawford); Mosteller,
Encouraging and Ensuring Confrontation, supra note 2, at 610-12 (advocating greater use of
pretrial hearings to provide confrontation required by Crawford).
25. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) (holding that cross-examination of
accuser at preliminary hearing was sufficient to meet constitutional requirements); People v.
Jurado, 131 P.3d 400 (Cal. 2006) (concluding that pretrial cross-examination satisfied Sixth
Amendment); State v. Estrella, 893 A.2d 348 (Conn. 2006) (same); State v. Young, 87 P.3d 308
(Kan. 2004) (same); State v. Mohamed, 130 P.3d 401 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (same). But see
People v. Frey, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004) (cross-examination at pretrial hearings does not satisfy
Confrontation Clause because defense attorneys have different motives at this stage).
26. Fourteen states now allow "support persons" in the courtroom. ARIz. R. CRim. P.
39(b)(9) (2004) (giving the victim the "right to name an appropriate support person, including a
victim's caseworker, to accompany the victim at any interview, deposition, or court proceeding,
except where such support person's testimony is required in the case."); CAL. PENAL CODE §
868.5 (West 2005) (allowing one support person to stand or sit by the witness's side when she
takes the stand); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-401 (2004) (a "victim's advocate"-defined as "any
person whose regular or volunteer duties include the support of an alleged victim of physical or
sexual abuse or assault"-may remain at trial even if the general public is sequestered.); 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 120/4(9) (2005) (all victims of crime have "[tihe right to have present at all court
proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence, an advocate or support person of the victim's
choice."); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 600.2163a (2005) (a victim of sexual assault or child abuse
"who is called upon to testify shall be permitted to have a support person sit with, accompany,
or be in close proximity to the witness during his or her testimony."); MINN. STAT.§ 631.046
(2004) (victims of sexual assault or child abuse may bring a "parent, guardian, or other
supportive person" to be present "at the omnibus hearing or the trial."); N.Y. Cimi. PROC. LAW
§ 190.25(3)(h) (McKinney 2005) (victims who are 12 years old or younger may be accompanied
by a "social worker, rape crisis counselor, psychologist or other professional."); OKLA. STAT. tit.
22, § 60.4(K) (2004) (a support person may accompany a domestic victim, but may not make
legal arguments); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-105-40 (2004) (support persons mayjoin victims during
testimony during disciplinary proceedings at "institutions of higher learning."); S.D. CODIFIED
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standing to object to inappropriate questions.27 Courts should exercise their power
under Federal Rule of Evidence 611 (and its state analogs) to control the manner of
cross-examination. In particular, courts must insist on age-appropriate questioning.
Jurisdictions should develop protocols for age-appropriate questioning, and should
perhaps even publish "pattern questions" that are more likely to withstand objection,
just as jurisdictions publish "pattern jury instructions" that are more likely to win the
approval of trial courts.
In sum, Crawford and Davis do not require the abandonment of videotaped
interviews in multidisciplinary centers. I agree with Professor Lyon that these
interviews are an important means of investigating alleged abuse and treating victims'
injuries, both psychological and corporal. Courts should admit the videotapes but
should also insist upon cross-examination of the accusers at some point. Demarcating
the limits of acceptable cross-examination will be an important task for the lower
courts, and perhaps even the Supreme Court, in the years ahead.
III. CLARIFYING THE FORFEITURE DOCTRINE
In both Crawford and Davis, the Supreme Court noted the continuing vitality of
forfeiture doctrine, whereby a defendant forfeits confrontation rights if he wrongfully
procures the unavailability of a hearsay declarant. 28 For some prosecutors, forfeiture
has a talismanic appeal. A researcher for the American Prosecutors Research Institute
has gone so far as to suggest that virtually all domestic violence cases present
opportunities for forfeiture arguments.29 Professor Mosteller has wisely cautioned that
forfeiture doctrine, if construed too broadly, might become the exception that swallows
the rule of the Confrontation Clause.30 My own view lies somewhere in the middle.
LAWS § 23A-28C-7 (2006) ("victim or witness assistant" may accompany victim to court); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-265.01 (2004) (parent or guardian of minor victim, or any other adult chosen
by victim, may be present at trial); WASH. REv. CODE § 7.69.030(10) (2005) (victim of violent
or sex crime may have "a crime victim advocate from a crime victim/witness program, or any
other support person of the victim's choosing, present at... judicial proceedings related to
criminal acts committed against the victim"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-408(b) (2004) (a support
person may be present with a child victim of incest or sexual assault during a videotaped
deposition); see also State v. Dunbar, 566 A.2d 970 (Vt. 1989) (allowing for a victim of child
molestation to testify with two support persons present).
27. See Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1353, 1398-400 (2005)
(discussing the value of attorneys to accusers).
28. The Crawford Court indicated that "the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we
accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds," even if the hearsay
at issue is plainly testimonial. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,62 (2004). The Davis court
discussed forfeiture in more detail, declaring that "when defendants seek to undermine the
judicial process by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth
Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce." Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2280
(2006). According to the Davis Court, "one who obtains the absence of a witness by
wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation." Id. After vacating one of the cases
reviewed in Davis, the Court suggested that the prosecution explore the applicability of
forfeiture doctrine on remand. See id.
29. Adam M. Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid: Applying Common
Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 14.
30. Mosteller, supra note 10, at 987.
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I favor a robust forfeiture doctrine, in part because Crawford and Davis have made
the victim's testimony so much more important for the success of a prosecution. By
making the victim indispensable, the new confrontation jurisprudence has made the
victim a more attractive target for coercion by the defendant.3' The Confrontation
Clause must be a shield, not a sword.32 At the same time, if the forfeiture argument
becomes too facile, courts will deprive defendants of confrontation rights simply due to
the nature of the charge-turning the presumption of innocence on its head.
In setting the parameters of the forfeiture doctrine, the most difficult challenge is to
determine what conduct should effect a forfeiture of confrontation rights. Surely
witness tampering (i.e., wrongful conduct undertaken with the intent of procuring the
absence of the witness at trial) should qualify under the forfeiture doctrine. At the other
extreme, conduct that incidentally and unforeseeably causes a witness to feel reluctant
about testifying should not forfeit the defendant's confrontation rights. The tricky
questions arise in the middle of the spectrum. For example, if the defendant
intentionally caused the death of the victim, but did not do so for the primary purpose
of causing the victim's absence at trial, should the defendant be able to invoke
confrontation rights at trial?
33
I suggest that forfeiture doctrine should extend to situations in which the victim
commits wrongful conduct that foreseeably and proximately causes the absence of the
victim at trial. The terms "foreseeable" and "proximate" do not create a bright-line
rule, but we have experience interpreting these terms in the context of tort law. I
recognize that such a forfeiture rule would present more complications than a regime in
which forfeiture is co-extensive with witness tampering, but I think the added
complexity is worth the trouble. The criminal justice system should not reward an
abuser whose conduct killed, incapacitated, or otherwise purposefully silenced a
witness, even if the abuser's primary purpose was not to procure unavailability.
All states should codify forfeiture as a hearsay exception. At present, the doctrine is
primarily a principle of constitutional interpretation that helps surmount the hurdle of
the Confrontation Clause,34 but a small number of jurisdictions have also created a
31. See State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311 (W. Va. 2006) (collecting various studies and
articles indicating that over half of defendants in domestic violence cases issue threats or
retaliate against accusers); see also Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2279-80 ("This particular type of crime
[domestic violence] is notoriously susceptible to intimidation and coercion of the victim to
ensure that she does not testify at trial."); Andrew King-Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A
Panacea for Victimless Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441, 442-43
(2006) (noting that "[m]any defendants charged with crimes of domestic violence engage in
wrongdoing designed to make it impossible for their victims to testify against them," and
arguing that this challenge has exacerbated the difficulty of "victimless" prosecutions after
Crawford).
32. Professor Joan Meier made this argument very persuasively in the amicus brief that she
filed in the Davis case. Brief for National Network to End Domestic Violence, Indiana and
Washington Coalitions Against Domestic Violence, Legal Momentum, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 1457 (2006) (Nos. 05-5224, 05-
5705), 2006 WL 284229.
33. On this subject, I strongly recommend Professor Raeder's outstanding article in the
Brooklyn Law Review, supra note 4.
34. The seminal case that addressed forfeiture by wrongdoing is Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879) (ruling that a defendant who wrongfully procures the unavailability
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hearsay exception based on the opponent's wrongful conduct. 35 The value of
codification is significant. To begin with, the rule puts judges and attorneys on notice
that forfeiture law is potentially applicable in a wide range of cases. 36 Further, the rule
helps to ensure that statutory law is no more restrictive than constitutional law in the
area of forfeiture. The present misalignment of constitutional and statutory law presents
the risk that prosecutors might succeed in proving forfeiture as a constitutional matter,
only to find that no statutory hearsay exception accommodates the hearsay in
question. 37 This risk is especially great in child abuse cases because the excited
utterance exception may not be available due to the lapse between the incident and the
interview.
38
CONCLUSION
The effective prosecution of child abuse does not require the circumvention of the
Confrontation Clause. We should not simply gerrymander the map of testimonial and
of a hearsay declarant cannot be heard to protest the admission of the absent declarant's hearsay
statements). For examples of cases that acknowledge forfeiture principles in states without
forfeiture statutes, see State v. Valencia, 924 P.2d 497 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Moore,
117 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 2000) (en banc);
State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004); State v. Magouirk, 539 So. 2d 50 (La. Ct. App.1988),
opinion withdrawn in part on reh'g, 561 So. 2d 801 (La. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Fields, 679
N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 2004); State v. Turner, No. CO-03-163 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2005);
State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1345-48 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); People v. Geraci,
649 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1995); Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); State
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nontestimonial hearsay. Rather, we should explore ways to allow confrontation of child
witnesses in a manner and setting that reduces the hardship for these witnesses. We
should also clarify the boundaries of forfeiture doctrine, so that defendants cannot
profit from intimidation of witnesses. Just as in the era of Maryland v. Craig, we can
adapt-but not abandon-confrontation law in order to address the exigencies of child
abuse prosecutions.
